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UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK:  
THE NEXT CHAPTER  
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN  
STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Lauren Kulpa* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Few issues concern parents, members of Congress, and the 
courts more than the welfare of children. When it comes to 
protecting our children, everything seems so necessary that it all 
becomes proper. Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause1 the Constitution empowers 
Congress to enact statutes authorizing court-ordered civil 
commitment of sexually dangerous, mentally ill federal prisoners.2 
The statute at issue arose out of a federal statutory regime aimed at 
protecting children from child pornography and sexual abuse. While 
the case holding may seem narrow, the flexibility of the Court’s 
novel five-factored test may result in increased federal intrusion into 
state sovereignty and jeopardize civil liberties. 
 
 * J.D., Loyola Law School Los Angeles, 2011; B.A., Texas A&M University, 2008. First, 
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 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 2. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act to protect children from sexual molestation, abuse, 
and child pornography, and to promote Internet safety.3 In relevant 
part, at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (“Section 4248”) the act provides for the 
“[c]ivil commitment of a sexually dangerous person.” This statute 
allows the Attorney General to seek from federal courts a 
certification that a person in federal custody is sexually dangerous.4 
For purposes of Section 4248, a person is sexually dangerous if the 
individual (1) “has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually 
violent conduct or child molestation”; (2) “suffers from a serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder”; and (3) “as a result of [the 
mental illness] would have serious difficulty in refraining from 
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”5 If the 
court finds the above criteria by clear and convincing evidence, then 
the court will commit the person to the Attorney General’s custody.6 
Upon certification, the Attorney General must make reasonable 
efforts to release the person to either the state in which the person 
was domiciled or the state in which the person was tried.7 If neither 
state will assume responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and 
treatment, then the Attorney General must place the person in a 
suitable facility until either a state will take responsibility for the 
person or the person is no longer sexually dangerous.8 
United States v. Comstock9 involved the government’s attempt 
to civilly commit five offenders as sexually dangerous pursuant to 
Section 4248. Three of the offenders—Graydon Comstock, Thomas 
Matherly, and Markis Revland—had all pled guilty to possession of 
child pornography;10 a fourth offender, Marvin Virgil, had pled guilty 
 
 3. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 
587 (2006). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). 
 5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a)(5)–(6) (2006). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. A person may be deemed no longer sexually dangerous if the person’s condition has 
improved or the condition is controlled by psychiatric, medical, or psychological treatment. Id. 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  
 10. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 551 
F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
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to sexual abuse of a minor.11 In each case, the offenders were on the 
verge of release from federal prison when the government sought 
certification under Section 4248.12 The fifth offender, Shane Catron, 
had been charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and 
abusive sexual conduct but was found incompetent to stand trial.13 
The government sought to certify Catron under Section 4248 around 
the same time as the other four offenders.14 The offenders brought 
suit against the government claiming, among other things, that 
Section 4248 exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.15 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina held that the statute was unconstitutional because it was not 
necessary and proper to carry out any enumerated power, such as 
Congress’s power to prosecute,16 to regulate pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause,17 or to prevent criminal conduct.18 In addition, the 
district court found that Section 4248 “impermissibly intrude[d] upon 
an area historically regulated by the states.”19 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause did not authorize Congress to enact this statute due to 
the absence of a sufficient link between certification as “sexual 
dangerousness” and a federal crime.20 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in June 2009 to settle a circuit split.21 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1955 (2010). 
 13. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 14. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955. 
 15. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 16. Id. at 534 (concluding “that civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons whose 
prison sentences are about to expire is not a necessary and proper extension of Congress's power 
to prosecute federal crimes”). 
 17. Id. at 534–36 (rejecting the government’s argument as an attempt to regulate 
noneconomic activity). 
 18. Id. at 536–40 (rejecting the government’s argument because the statute does not account 
for an offender’s likelihood to commit a federal sex crime as opposed to a state sex crime). 
 19. Id. at 551. The district court also addressed whether the statute constituted a criminal 
rather than civil proceeding (ultimately finding Section 4248 to be a civil scheme), id. at 529–30, 
and whether the statute’s clear and convincing standard violated due process (finding that due 
process requires a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). Id. at 551–59. The Supreme Court did 
not address these issues. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 20. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 282, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 
1949. 
 21. United States v. Comstock, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009). The Eighth Circuit held that Section 
4248 was within Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 502–03 (8th Cir. 2009). The First Circuit 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion, which was joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Stevens.22 The Court only addressed whether Congress had authority 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause23 to enact the statute at issue; 
it did not decide whether other constitutional violations, such as due 
process or equal protection violations, existed.24 Using an 
unprecedented analysis, the majority upheld Section 4248, finding 
that Congress had the constitutional power to enact the statute.25 In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on five considerations: 
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the 
long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the 
sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the 
government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public 
from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the 
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the 
statute’s narrow scope.26 
The reasoning behind each factor is described below. 
1.  Breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
First, the Court set up a deferential backdrop for its analysis.27 
The Court found that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives 
Congress “broad authority to enact federal legislation.”28 Citing 
McCulloch v. Maryland,29 Justice Breyer noted that while the 
government is given limited enumerated powers, it must have “ample 
 
held that the statute was within Congress’s constitutional authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and did not infringe on the states’ powers. United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, 
10 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 22. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1953. For a poetic recap of the government’s and respondents’ 
arguments, see Court Commentary: U.S. v. Comstock . . . In Verse (Feb. 28, 2010), 
http://culturefuture.blogspot.com/2010/02/court-commentary-united-states-v.html. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 24. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1965. 
 27. See id. at 1956–58. 
 28. Id. at 1956. 
 29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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means for [the] execution” of those powers.30 Additionally, 
“necessary” does not mean absolutely necessary.31 To determine 
whether a statute falls within the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
courts must “look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that 
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”32 This test presumes that Congress’s choice of 
means is constitutional, leaving much to Congress’s discretion.33 
Justice Breyer then looked to several areas as examples when 
Congress had passed legislation purportedly in furtherance of its 
enumerated powers, despite the Constitution not specifically 
enumerating the power for such legislation.34 To start, Justice Breyer 
noted that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to further its enumerated powers by creating a wide range of 
federal crimes, even though the Constitution only explicitly grants 
Congress the power to criminalize acts relating to “counterfeiting,” 
“treason,” and “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas” or 
“against the Law of Nations.”35 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
also allows Congress to enforce federal crimes by building prison 
facilities and sentencing offenders to federal prisons.36 Congress’s 
power extends even further to regulate the federal prisons by 
enacting laws that “ensure the safety of the prisoners, prison workers 
and visitors, and those in the surrounding communities . . . .”37 In 
other words, the Constitution does not explicitly give Congress the 
power to criminalize conduct, imprison offenders, or enact laws 
governing prisons and prisoners; however, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause grants Congress these powers because they are rational means 
to implement constitutionally enumerated powers.38 
 
 30. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1957. 
 34. Id. at 1957–58. 
 35. Id. at 1957 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10). 
 36. Id. at 1958. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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2.  History of Federal Involvement 
Next, Justice Breyer determined that the federal government had 
a history of involvement in prison-related mental-health regulation 
and that Section 4248 was only a “modest addition” to this statutory 
scheme.39 While the government’s history of involvement is not 
determinative of a statute’s constitutionality, it is “helpful in 
reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme” and in 
determining whether the statute is reasonably related to the pre-
existing federal interests.40 Justice Breyer traced congressional 
involvement back to the mid-to-late 1800s, which evolved from 
establishing a hospital to treat the Army and Navy’s insane 
population to creating a civil-commitment scheme for persons who 
had become insane while in federal custody.41 
Starting in the late 1940s, Congress made a series of reforms to 
its civil-commitment legislation in response to concerns regarding 
the release of dangerous and insane prisoners.42 These reforms 
eventually led to the creation of the civil-commitment statute used 
today, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.43 Section 4246 of 
the Insanity Defense Reform Act authorizes civil commitment if the 
prisoner’s “release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another person or serious damage to the property of another.”44 
Justice Breyer found that Section 4248 only differed from Section 
4246 in that it targets persons who are “sexually dangerous” due to 
mental illness.45 
3.  Government’s Custodial Interest 
Third, Justice Breyer concluded that the federal government’s 
extension of its civil-commitment system to cover mentally ill and 
sexually dangerous prisoners was reasonable, even if it effectively 
extended the prisoners’ sentences.46 Justice Breyer rooted his 
 
 39. Id. at 1961. 
 40. Id. at 1958 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005)). 
 41. Id. at 1958–59. 
 42. Id. at 1959–61. 
 43. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–4247 (2006); Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1960. 
 44. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1960 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)). 
 45. Id. at 1961. 
 46. Id. 
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reasonableness analysis in the federal government’s role as the 
custodian of its prisoners.47 He described this unenumerated role as 
one that gives the federal government the constitutional power to act 
to protect communities from dangers that federal prisoners may 
impose.48 Thus, he found Section 4248 “‘reasonably adapted’ to 
Congress’ power to act as a responsible federal custodian” because it 
was reasonable for Congress to conclude that mentally ill and 
sexually dangerous federal inmates might pose a great threat to the 
public if released.49 
4.  Statute’s Accommodation of State Interests 
Fourth, Justice Breyer concluded that Section 4248 does not 
violate the states’ interests.50 He rejected the respondents’ claim that 
Section 4248 violates the Tenth Amendment by allowing the federal 
government to regulate an area typically left to state control.51 Justice 
Breyer reasoned that powers delegated to the federal government 
include both constitutionally enumerated powers and the authority 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement those powers.52 
Therefore, because the Tenth Amendment reserves only powers not 
delegated to the United States as powers for the states, the power to 
regulate federal prisoners cannot be considered a power reserved to 
the states.53 
Justice Breyer also noted that Section 4248 does not invade state 
sovereignty or limit states’ powers.54 Instead, by requiring the 
Attorney General to encourage states to take responsibility for 
offenders, the statute accommodates the states’ interests.55 If a state 
asserts authority over a prisoner, then the federal government must 
immediately transfer that prisoner into state custody.56 In addition, 
Justice Breyer concluded that Section 4248 better protects states’ 
 
 47. Id. at 1961–62. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1961 (internal citation omitted). 
 50. Id. at 1962–63. 
 51. Id. at 1962. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (citing Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006)). 
 56. Id. 
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interests than its 1949 predecessor statute, which the Court had 
previously upheld.57 
5.  Statute’s Narrow Scope 
Finally, Justice Breyer found that Section 4248’s connection to 
an enumerated power was neither “too attenuated” nor “too sweeping 
in its scope.”58 He rejected the contention that “Congress’ authority 
can be no more than one step removed from a specifically 
enumerated power.”59 He found support in the Court’s precedent, 
which has held that from Congress’s implied power to punish flows 
its implied power to imprison and to civilly commit mentally ill 
prisoners.60 Justice Breyer also provided examples in which the Court 
had applied this “implied power flowing from an implied power” 
analysis in upholding statutes enacted to execute enumerated powers 
under the Spending Clause.61 
Justice Breyer also reasoned that the statute’s limited application 
of congressional power did not threaten state sovereignty. He 
rejected claims that upholding the statute would give Congress a 
general police power, which is generally reserved for the states.62 
Because the statute’s reach is limited to a small fraction of prisoners 
and to those already in federal custody, he gave no credence to the 
concern that the federal government was usurping power from the 
states.63 
B.  Concurrences 
While Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority holding, his 
concurrence expressed concern that the majority did not fully 
account for possible federalism violations.64 First, Justice Kennedy 
(and Justice Alito)65 was concerned that the majority’s analysis 
 
 57. Id. at 1963 (referring to Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1964. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1964–65. 
 64. See id. at 1965–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 1968–70 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the statute can be upheld under the 
more traditional Necessary and Proper analysis because it is necessary and proper to “carrying 
into execution the enumerated powers that support the federal criminal statutes under which the 
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misapplied rational basis review. He distinguished between the 
highly deferential rational basis test used in the context of due 
process challenges and the more exacting rational basis required in 
Commerce Clause cases.66 He warned against blending the two 
standards, fearing that the majority’s discussion of rational basis in 
analyzing claims under the Necessary and Proper Clause could 
improperly be read as requiring a “mere conceivable rational 
relation,” as is typically used for due process rational basis, instead 
of requiring a “tangible link” to the enumerated power.67 
Second, Justice Kennedy cautioned against Congress usurping 
states’ powers.68 He warned that analyzing Congress’s power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause must go one step further—to 
address whether the power compromises “essential attributes of state 
sovereignty.”69 Merely deciding first that the power falls under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause without then determining whether 
federalist concerns improperly limit the power broadens the scope of 
congressional power.70 
C.  Thomas’s Dissent 
Justice Thomas, joined for the most part by Justice Scalia, 
dissented from the majority opinion because the majority failed to 
show that Section 4248 executed an enumerated power.71 Justice 
Thomas emphasized that “[t]he Constitution plainly sets forth the 
‘few and defined’ powers that Congress may exercise” and that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is used to carry out these “few and 
defined powers.”72 Justice Thomas criticized the majority for failing 
to name the enumerated power that Section 4248 seeks to carry out.73 
He argued that the statute does not even come within the broadly 
construed Commerce Clause’s purview because precedent states that 
Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity based only on its 
 
affected prisoners were convicted,” and thus “protect the public from dangers created by the 
federal criminal justice and prison systems”). 
 66. Id. at 1966–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 1967. 
 68. Id. at 1966. 
 69. Id. at 1967–68. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 1971 (quotations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 1973. 
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effect on interstate commerce.74 Instead, he viewed Section 4248 as 
similar to the involuntary civil-commitment laws that states enact 
under their general police powers.75 
Justice Thomas also questioned the majority’s use of a five-
factor test instead of McCulloch’s framework to determine Section 
4248’s constitutionality.76 Referring to the test as “novel,” Justice 
Thomas commented that the test raises more questions than it 
answers because the majority never specified whether all factors are 
needed, which factors are most important if only some are needed, 
and so forth.77 He then raised counterarguments as to the majority’s 
analysis of each factor.78 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Majority’s Departure from a Formulaic Analysis 
Despite predictions that the Court would find Section 4248 
unconstitutional,79 the majority held that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause gives Congress the power to enact this statute. The majority’s 
unprecedented five-factored analysis was necessary to uphold the 
civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders because the statute 
could not withstand a more traditional analysis under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 
1.  Section 4248 Likely Cannot Withstand the 
Traditional Means-Ends Analysis 
In discussing factor one (the breadth of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause), Justice Breyer correctly explained that “necessary” 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause has not been interpreted to 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1974. 
 76. See id. at 1974–75. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1975–83. 
 79. See, e.g., Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 1753, 1754–55 (2009). Additionally, some scholars argue that the expansion of federal 
crimes violates federalism. See, e.g., Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 837–39 (2000). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice 
Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 53–59 (2008) (tracking 
the historical expansion of federal crimes). 
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mean “absolutely necessary.”80 He then developed the “means-ends” 
test to determine whether Congress’s actions fall within the 
Necessary and Proper Clause’s scope:81 “whether the statute 
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of 
a constitutionally enumerated power.”82 Put another way, the inquiry 
asks “whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the 
attainment of a legitimate end” under Congress’s constitutional 
powers.83 However, as Justice Thomas commented, Justice Breyer 
ignored this framework and instead listed five factors that led him to 
conclude that Section 4248 is constitutional.84 
Under a more traditional means-ends analysis, the Court could 
not uphold Section 4248 because the statute does not rationally relate 
to furthering an enumerated power. The majority correctly pointed 
out that Congress has the power to enact criminal laws that are 
necessary and proper to carrying out their enumerated powers.85 
Chief Justice John Marshall described the classic example in 
McCulloch.86 From Congress’s enumerated power to establish post 
offices and post roads, it “has been inferred the power and duty of 
carrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to 
another. And, from this implied power, has again been inferred the 
right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the 
mail.”87 These inferred-from-inferred powers are all rationally related 
to Congress’s enumerated power to establish a national post office 
system. Here, however, unlike in McCulloch, Congress did not seek 
to punish those who had impeded its enumerated rights. Instead, 
Congress went one step further to prevent crimes—whether or not 
those crimes involve violations of federal or state law. 
The Adam Walsh Act set out “[t]o protect children from sexual 
exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child 
 
 80. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
413–15 (1819)). 
 81. Id. at 1956–57. 
 82. Id. at 1956 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 1957 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005)). 
 84. See id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court perfunctorily genuflects to 
McCulloch’s framework for assessing Congress’ Necessary and Proper Clause authority, . . . then 
promptly abandons both in favor of a novel five-factor test . . . .”). 
 85. See id. at 1957–58 (majority opinion). 
 86. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819). 
 87. See id. 
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pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of 
Adam Walsh and other child crime victims.”88 The act was likely 
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, as this clause has been 
interpreted to give Congress expansive powers.89 The act 
criminalizes child pornography, kidnapping, and child prostitution.90 
Congress’s “legitimate end” under the Commerce Clause could be to 
punish those who violate Congress’s statutory mandate that child 
prostitution and pornography be kept out of the stream of commerce. 
Thus, Section 4248 must be a means that is “rationally related” to 
implementing the federal sex-crimes regulations.91 
Past cases upholding congressional action under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause have had a closer link between the action and the 
enumerated power than Section 4248 does with the Commerce 
Clause. For example, in Greenwood v. United States92 (discussed in 
briefs for both parties), the Court upheld a civil-commitment statute 
for those mentally incompetent to stand trial for federal crimes.93 In 
Greenwood, the offender was awaiting trial in federal court for 
robbing a post office.94 The Court, in upholding the statute, explained 
that the “[t]he power to put [the offender] into such custody—the 
power to prosecute for federal offenses—[was] not exhausted.”95 The 
government’s power to commit the offender was a rationally related 
means to carrying out its power to establish post offices; the 
government must be able to prosecute crimes against post offices to 
ensure that the post offices are efficiently run. 
The majority failed to distinguish Greenwood from the case at 
hand.96 Section 4248, unlike the statute in Greenwood, does not 
enable the government to punish and imprison offenders for federal 
sex crimes because the offenders have already been sentenced. In 
 
 88. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 
587. 
 89. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the Commerce 
Clause as “the enumerated power [the Supreme Court] has interpreted most expansively”); see, 
e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress’s ban of home-grown 
marijuana may be upheld under the Commerce Clause). 
 90. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 120 Stat. at 587–89. 
 91. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 92. 350 U.S. 366 (1956). 
 93. Id. at 375. 
 94. Id. at 369. 
 95. Id. at 375. 
 96. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963. 
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fact, four of the five offenders in this case were within months of 
being released when the government sought civil-commitment 
certification under Section 4248.97 In essence, the government’s 
power to prosecute federal crimes had already been exhausted. 
The majority’s and government’s insistence that Section 4248 is 
linked to the government’s custodial power is similarly 
unconvincing.98 It is undisputed that Congress holds the power to 
house federal prisoners and apprehend escaped prisoners pursuant to 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.99 For instance, extending the 
McCulloch example, the government’s implied power to punish 
those who steal from the post office would be meaningless unless the 
government could establish a facility to house offenders being 
punished. In addition, the government has the implied power to 
apprehend escaped prisoners; it would be meaningless to have the 
power to punish offenders for federal crimes yet lack the power to 
ensure that the offenders serve their sentences in their entirety. In this 
example, both the implied power to build prisons and the implied 
power to apprehend escaped prisoners rationally relate to the 
government’s enumerated power to establish post offices. 
Section 4248, however, does not flow from an implied power to 
build prisons and apprehend federal prisoners. The statute does not 
ensure that an offender serves his full sentence as punishment for a 
federal crime pursuant to Congress furthering an enumerated 
power.100 Instead, Section 4248 is a preventive measure—a person in 
federal custody may be civilly committed to prevent the person from 
engaging in sexually violent conduct or child molestation upon 
release.101 The preventive nature of Section 4248, unlike those of the 
statutes at issue in McCulloch and Greenwood, does not further 
Congress’s enforcement of an enumerated power. Furthermore, the 
 
 97. Id. at 1955. 
 98. See id. at 1961–62; Reply Brief for the United States at 14–17, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 
1949 (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 4247966, at *14–17. 
 99. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 100. See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Limits of Federal Power, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 249–51 (discussing the 
disconnect between Section 4248 and Congress’s authority that flows from its enumerated 
powers). 
 101. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006) (stating that the Attorney General may certify that the 
person is sexually dangerous and that he or she may not be discharged until found to no longer be 
sexually dangerous to others). 
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civil-commitment statute considers all sex crimes. While an 
argument could be made that the commitment regime may be 
necessary and proper to carrying out the prevention of federal sex 
crimes such as child pornography, the civil-commitment statute does 
not limit itself to the prevention of purely federal crimes.102 A 
propensity toward any sexual violence (whether constituting a 
federal or state crime) will count in the certification proceedings.103 
Because Section 4248 is not a means rationally related to 
furthering any enumerated power, it is beyond Congress’s 
constitutional power. Section 4248 does not allow for the 
prosecution, or even prevention, of federal crimes. The conduct has 
already been punished and the statute instead seeks to prevent 
conduct that exceeds the bounds of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause. Thus, Section 4248 could not be upheld under the 
traditional means-ends analysis. 
2.  Strategic Move to Five-Factored Test 
Given that Section 4248 could not withstand the traditional 
means-ends analysis, the majority’s decision to uphold the statute 
under a five-factored test seems deliberate. Some commentators 
regard Comstock as an indication of the Court’s response to 
inevitable issues regarding the constitutionality of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.104 Issues like this may fare better 
under the majority’s analysis as opposed to the traditional means-
 
 102. Justice Alito argues that there is an “attenuated link” between congressional powers to 
enact criminal statutes and Section 4248 because Congress must protect the public from 
dangerous federal prisoners under a traditional Necessary and Proper Clause analysis. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring). However, he fails to address that Congress is exceeding 
its power by not limiting the statute’s application to federal crimes. 
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (defining “sexually dangerous person” as “a person who has 
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is 
sexually dangerous to others”). 
 104. See Marcia Coyle, Health Care Reform Spurs Litigation Talk, 32 NAT’L L.J. 25, (2009); 
David G. Savage, Justices Widen Federal Scope, BALT. SUN, May 18, 2010, at 1A; Michael C. 
Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Decision About Sexually Dangerous Federal Prisoners: Could It 
Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance?, 
FINDLAW.COM (May 19, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html. Still others 
suggest that the majority wanted to uphold the statute because it dealt with sexual deviants, an 
unpopular social group. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Necessary and Proper to Extend Civil 
Commitment for Sex Offenders CONST. L. PROF BLOG (May 17, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/05/necessary-and-proper-to-extend-civil-
committment-for-sex-offenders-comstock-opinion-analysis.html. 
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ends analysis because the majority’s five-factored analysis could be 
read to give Congress even more sweeping powers.105 
First, the five-factored analysis tips the scales in favor of the 
constitutionality of Congress’s actions from the start. The first 
factor’s assertion that “the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation” sets the tone 
for this deferential analysis.106 In describing this factor, Justice 
Breyer makes clear that courts should defer to Congress’s 
judgment.107 Rather than a factor, this seems to state a presumption in 
favor of upholding congressional action, like the deferential rational 
basis review used in substantive due process claims.108 
Second, the majority favors constitutionality through its 
willingness to allow implied powers to count as legitimate ends. This 
allows Justice Breyer to conclude that the link between Section 4248 
and a legitimate end are “not too attenuated.”109 In deciding this, 
Justice Breyer echoed those powers set out by the government110 to 
find that Congress has an implied power to punish and imprison, and 
a further implied power to enact civil-commitment laws. As 
discussed above, had the majority followed a more traditional means-
ends analysis, in which legitimate ends are limited to those 
enumerated powers in the Constitution, then Section 4248 could not 
pass constitutional muster.111 By allowing an analysis to rest on 
implied powers rather than enumerated powers, the Court allows 
Congress to claim broader powers and imposes a less stringent 
connection between the means and the ends. 
Finally, the majority’s use of factors allows for flexibility in the 
analysis, which could favor finding Congress’s actions 
constitutional. Justice Thomas’s dissent raises an important question 
 
 105. But see Somin, supra note 100, at 262–64 (explaining how the Comstock majority 
opinion might actually be detrimental to the individual mandate of the Obama administration’s 
health care plan in court). 
 106. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 107. See id. at 1957. 
 108. See id. at 1966–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 1963 (majority opinion). 
 110. Brief for the United States at 21–39, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 
2896312, at *21–39 (describing “Congress’s unquestioned power to enact criminal laws 
prohibiting conduct within the scope of its Article I powers, to operate a federal penal system for 
the punishment of offenses under those laws, and to place persons convicted of or pending trial 
for violating those laws in federal custody”). 
 111. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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regarding the “novel” five-factored analysis, pointing out the lack of 
clarity under the majority’s holding as to whether all five factors are 
necessary to uphold a statute under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.112 Even Justice Alito’s concurrence expresses concern over 
the ambiguity of the majority’s standard.113 Because of this, lower 
courts may be able to uphold a statute that satisfies a few, rather than 
all, of the outlined factors. 
B.  Restoring Balance 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy writes to “caution that the 
Constitution does require the invalidation of congressional attempts 
to extend federal powers in some instances.”114 His concern regarding 
the implications of the majority’s analysis is not unfounded. As 
discussed above, the analysis has the potential to broaden Congress’s 
power past its constitutional limits. However, there are ways that 
courts can limit the majority opinion’s potentially sweeping effects. 
First, courts can take note of Justice’s Kennedy’s distinction 
between the deferential substantive due process rational basis 
analysis and the more exacting rational basis analysis used under the 
Commerce Clause. This will allow the first factor to become less of a 
presumption in favor of congressional action and allow for more 
scrutiny by the courts. 
Second, courts should employ a more robust federalism analysis 
under the fourth factor. The fourth factor analyzes whether a statute 
properly accounts for states’ interests.115 However, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence expresses concern that the majority’s opinion sets a 
precedent that does not properly protect states’ interests.116 Under the 
majority’s analysis, it seems that Congress can circumvent 
federalism concerns by giving states the option to step in (like 
Section 4248, which allows states to take responsibility for the 
offender).117 Justice Kennedy warns “[i]t is of fundamental 
importance to consider whether essential attributes of state 
sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under 
 
 112. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1974–75 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 1968 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 1962 (majority opinion). 
 116. Id. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 117. Id. at 1962–63 (majority opinion). 
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the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting 
that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal 
power.”118 Thus, courts should take federalism concerns more 
seriously and be wary of allowing the “inference upon inference” 
analysis to turn into a general police power.119 
Third, courts should use the majority’s fifth factor to limit 
Comstock’s potentially broad implications. Both the majority’s 
discussion of the fifth factor120 and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence121 
note that the statute is narrow as it only applies to sexually dangerous 
federal prisoners. While a statute’s narrow scope does not justify 
Congress acting outside the scope of its constitutional powers, this 
factor can be used by courts to limit its application to federal crimes 
that society finds particularly reprehensible, such as sex crimes 
against children.122 Even though states have their own sex-offender 
laws, Congress’s federalization of certain sex crimes attempts to 
create a national strategy to combat these crimes, allowing for 
communication among states to prosecute and prevent these 
crimes.123  
Regardless, courts must be wary of this type of analysis because 
it could be used to justify detaining those convicted of other 
deplorable crimes beyond their sentences.124 As one author noted, 
many suspected terrorists are not charged under the terrorism statute 
but instead are charged with immigration or weapons violations, 
which result in lesser penalties.125 By using Section 4248 as a model, 
Congress could pass a statute that allows the civil commitment of 
 
 118. Id. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 119. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 120. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (describing Section 4248 as “narrow in scope” and 
applying “to a small fraction of federal prisoners”). 
 121. Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing Section 4248 as a “discrete and narrow 
exercise of authority over a small class of persons already subject to federal power”). 
 122. See Logan, supra note 79, at 60–61 (discussing the wave of societal concern regarding 
the sexual victimization of children). 
 123. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 
Stat. 587 (establishing the National Sex Offender Registry). 
 124. See Collin P. Wedel, War Courts: Terror’s Distorting Effects on Federal Courts, 3 
LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 7, 23–26 (2011) (explaining how the Court’s ruling in Comstock sets a 
disturbing precedent for terrorist-detainees); see also Predators and the Constitution, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A24 (“In other countries, loose detention laws give wide latitude to 
authorities to lock up any number of people who ‘threaten the public safety,’ including political 
prisoners.”). 
 125. Wedel, supra note 124, at 24–25. 
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dangerous terrorists, who may have serious difficulty in refraining 
from violent or terrorist conduct if released, thus allowing the 
government to increase incarceration penalties without charging and 
convicting the person of a new crime.126 Similarly, Congress could 
pass a Comstock-like prevention statute targeting violent drug 
addicts; under such a statute, the government would have the 
authority to civilly commit federally incarcerated prisoners who have 
committed violent crimes while under the influence of drugs, have 
serious drug addictions, and would have serious difficulty in 
refraining from drug use if released.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the majority’s employment of a five-factored 
analysis, as opposed to the traditional means-ends analysis, was 
pivotal in upholding Section 4248, allowing for the civil commitment 
of sexually dangerous federal offenders. Whether the Court’s 
analysis was a strategic decision to allow the federal government to 
combat sex crimes, especially those against children, or to increase 
the likelihood that constitutional issues will be resolved in favor of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the majority’s 
approach does tip the scales in favor of the constitutionality of 
Congress’s actions. In the future, courts will need to employ a more 
rigorous federalism analysis to ensure that states’ interests are not 
overlooked and to limit the federal government’s powers to those 
actually given to them by the Constitution. 
 
 
 126. Id. at 25–26 (suggesting that Congress could “tweak the Comstock statute to allow 
indefinite detention based on a finding that a prisoner (1) previously ‘engaged or attempted to 
engage in [terrorism-related] violent conduct,’ (2) remains committed to his terrorist cause, and 
(3) as a result of his terrorism connections, remains ‘dangerous to others’ such that ‘he would 
have serious difficulty in refraining from [terrorist or] violent conduct if released’”). 
